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ABSTRACT
The regnant interpretation of the American Civil War includes the fact that it
evolved into a “total war,” which adumbrated the total wars of the twentieth century.
Mark E. Neely, in 1991, published an influential paper calling this interpretation into
question for the first time. In the article Neely revealed that the first mention of “total
war” in connection with the Civil War was an article written in 1948 by John Bennett
Walters about Gen. William T. Sherman and a raid he ordered on Randolph, Tennessee in
reprisal for an attempted hijacking of the packet boat Eugene on the Mississippi River.
Walters castigates Sherman’s raid as brutal, cruel, and wanton and tries to depict
Sherman as a violent and hateful man who set out to punish Southerners for turning their
backs on the Union. He—along with modern residents of Tipton County, Tennessee—
claim that Sherman burned the whole town to the ground. But a close investigation of the
target of Sherman’s attack shows that Randolph, Tennessee had been a ghost town since
the mid 1840s with the result that very little actual damage was done. There may have
been as many as six dwellings in the area along with dozens of abandoned and derelict
buildings. Sherman’s orders to the troops were to let the citizens know that Union
officials abhorred this kind of violence but were forced by guerilla activities to burn their
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homes to discourage continued attacks on river boats. The residents were given sufficient
time to remove their belongings before the buildings were set afire.
The results of this investigation suggest that the raid on Randolph might be
emblematic of much of the purported devastation of the South by Sherman and his
armies. Perhaps the “total war” on the South was illusory and has been greatly
exaggerated along with the destructiveness of the Civil War. The term “total war” seems
never to have been used in the nineteenth century. Total war is a twentieth-century term
and is completely bound up with twentieth-century technology, especially with aircraft as
weapons of mass destruction. The kind of destruction encompassed by “total war” was
unimaginable in Civil War times, especially the deliberate killing of noncombatant
civilians. It is argued, then, that the use of the term “total war” to describe the American
Civil War is anachronistic and thus entails the projection of twentieth century realities
into the past.
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JOHN BENNETT WALTERS, TOTAL WAR, AND THE RAID ON
RANDOLPH, TENNESSEE

It never occurred to historians prior to World War II to ask whether or not the
Civil War was a total war, but since that time the question has been asked frequently and
mostly answered in the affirmative. The view that the Civil War was a “total war” has
gained the acceptance of most Civil War historians. Because this interpretation is so
widespread, few historians explain what it is that they mean by “total war.” They take for
granted that readers will understand the term. For instance, T. Harry Williams, a highly
respected historian of the Civil War, used “total war” in the first sentence of his
influential book, Lincoln and His Generals.1 But he fails to explain what he means by it,
and the term does not appear again until one of his final chapters, where he again does
not bother to explain what he means. Apparently he, like many other Civil War
historians, finds the term unproblematic and assumes that everyone knows what “total
war” means and how it applies to the Civil War.
Despite its relatively wide acceptance, some historians, writing in the wake of the
Vietnam conflict, saw that the Civil War did not necessarily begin as a “total war,” even
if it seemed to end that way. These historians argued that it started as a “limited war” and
then progressed to a “total war.” Many, perhaps most, historians now view this
transformation from limited to total war as central to a basic understanding of the Civil

1

T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals (New York: Knopf, 1952), 3, 261.
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War. This “total war hypothesis” is the dominant view among Civil War historians in the
twenty-first century.
Mark E. Neely, the earliest and most steadfast of the critics of the total war
hypothesis, has argued that the concept of “total war” was somehow “in the air”
following World War II and that this accounted for the wide and uncritical acceptance
among historians of the term “total war.”2 Neely simply meant that the term was in wide
use and that most educated people understood what it meant—it meant a war in which
civilians were targeted by enemy military forces and in which no restraints were
acknowledged. Neely’s critique of using the term “total war” to describe the Civil War
appeared first in an influential 1991 article in Civil War History. More than anything,
Neely pointed to how historians had uncritically accepted the term and had repeatedly
misused it in their accounts of the Civil War.
What Neely did not specifically mention, but which adds to the problematical use
of “total war” to describe the Civil War, is the tendency of historians to use the term in
various and imprecise ways. This conceptual fluidity makes analysis difficult, for
meanings need to be teased out from context, a process that necessarily involves another
layer of interpretation. And even when the term is addressed explicitly, historians still
employ the term in radically different ways. A case in point may be found in Phillip
Shaw Paludan’s A People’s Contest, in which he argues that Sherman had “waged total
war against the property, not the lives, of Confederate citizens.” Thus he suggests the
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Mark E. Neely, “‘Civilized Belligerents’: Abraham Lincoln and the Idea of ‘Total War,’” in
John Y. Simon and Michael E. Stevens, eds., New Perspectives on the Civil War: Myths and Realities of
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possibility that total war can actually, in such an instance, be a “partial, total war.” Other
historians, such as Professor Harry S. Stout, disagree and insist on a harsher definition of
“total war.” According to Stout, the Civil War was “a total war on the Confederacy that
deliberately targeted civilian farms, cities, and—in at least fifty thousand instances—
civilian lives.”3
Neely suggests three reasons for the rise and acceptance of “total war” by scholars
to describe the Civil War. One flows from the “extravagant threats of violence [that]
ruled political debate, much military correspondence, and the journalism of the Civil War
era.” The language of the Civil War was often unrestrained even though the behavior of
leaders and soldiers generally was not. This fact “helps explain the erroneous impression
of the nature of the Civil War that now dominates the field”—that it was “total” and
unrestrained. Another factor that helps explain the wide and uncritical acceptance of this
idea, says Neely, derives from the emphasis on social history that emerged in the 1960s
and continues to attract a good number of Civil War historians. In writing about Civil
War combat, social historians have focused increasingly on the individual soldier, a point
of view which, out of necessity, emphasizes the horrifying violence and destruction that
soldiers on the front line witnessed, usually more than once. By emphasizing the role of
individual combatants, some historians greatly exaggerate the violence of the Civil War,
which was no more or less violent than, for instance, the Napoleonic Wars. War did not
change; historians writing about war changed. A third factor, Neely argues, may be that
historians after World War II felt that the Civil War had been romanticized for too long,
and they sought to remind their readers that war is awful; that war is bloody, destructive,
3

Phillip Shaw Paludan, A People’s Contest (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 304; Harry S.
Stout, Upon the Altar of the Nation: A Moral History of the Civil War (New York: Viking, 2006), xvi.
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and violent; that war produces dead and dying people and horses and body parts piled up
in bloody, filthy messes at the end of a smoking battle. War is not heroic; war is not
glorious; war is not a storybook adventure. People needed to know that. Still, Neely
suggests, a subtle presentism might have crept unwittingly into historians’ efforts to
describe the violence of the Civil War.4
According to Neely, the first historian responsible for applying the term “total
war” to the Civil War was John Bennett Walters, a Southern historian who received a
Ph.D. from Vanderbilt University in 1947, just two years after the close of World War II.
In 1948, Walters published an article, “General William T. Sherman and Total War,” that
attempted to demonstrate how Sherman, while serving in Memphis in the summer of
1862, began to conceive of a new philosophy of war, a philosophy of “total war,” by
which Walters meant “a plan of action which would destroy the enemy’s economic
system and terrify and demoralize the civilian population.” Walters sought to make his
case against Sherman by examining how troops under his general command had burned
the community of Randolph, Tennessee, in September 1862. In Walters’s formulation,
total war consisted of two elements—attacks on the enemy’s economic ability to make
war, and “the use of military force against the civilian population of the enemy.” Walters
further believed that “total war” also encompassed a moral component, since, in his view,
“total war” was waged with willful disregard for the civilized standards of war and the
protections that civilized nations universally offered to civilian noncombatants in the
4

Neely, Civil War, 215-218. John Keegan, a military historian, notes: “All battles are, in some
degree, and to a greater or lesser number of the combatants, disasters. Waterloo was a disaster of very
considerable magnitude. Within a space of about two square miles of open, waterless, treeless, and almost
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nineteenth century. In other words, total war—and particularly the kind of war fought by
Sherman against the Confederacy—was immoral, an extreme form of warfare that went
against the norms of decency as recognized by the civilized world.5
To prove his point, Walters emphasized “[Sherman’s] new concept of the
employment of terror against the armies and the civilian population alike.” He referred to
Sherman’s military actions in West Tennessee as an “experiment in terror.” Terrorism
and terror, of course, are not neutral words; they carry with them large measures of moral
opprobrium. And that was precisely what Walters wanted to communicate by using those
highly charged terms. What was more, morally loaded claims abounded in Walters’s
assessment of Sherman. “Under [Sherman’s] tutelage,” wrote Walters, his soldiers
“learned to direct their hatred against the people of the South and to visit upon them the
savage art of destruction and the disregard for human rights and dignity which the rules
of war had sought to mitigate.” Walters frequently used the language of Lost Cause
ideology to underscore Sherman’s lack of moral restraint and how Southerners suffered
as victims under his hand. For example, he described Sherman’s march to the sea and
beyond as “the application of his philosophy of total war on a grand scale . . . marked by

5

John Bennett Walters, “General William T. Sherman and Total War,” Journal of Southern
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a trail of burned houses, needless destruction of the necessities of life, and the wholesale
theft of private property.” According to Walters, upon arriving in South Carolina,
Sherman “resumed his campaign of terror on a more extensive scale.” Wherever
Sherman went, Walters wrote, “wanton waste, arson, looting, and other indignities [were]
visited upon the defenseless citizens by a ruthless soldiery.”6
Even if Sherman’s “total war” tactics may have helped win the war, Walters
insisted that the Union general made the post-war healing far more difficult by
brutalizing Southern civilians: “The utter helplessness of the victims of such brutality,
forced to stand by while humiliations and indignities were heaped upon them, left lasting
scars upon the memories of those so mistreated.” Walters claimed that Sherman “could
view his first full-dress performance in total war with satisfaction.” In the wake of
Sherman’s army,” he said, lay “unrestrained pillage and destruction.” As it prepared to
leave Atlanta, Sherman’s army, in Walters’s estimation, was ready “to apply the concept
of total war with a zeal which only hate could inspire and a thoroughness which
represented the culmination of two years of experience in destruction.” Sherman’s army,
asserted Walters, “left behind them a trail of terror and desolation, burned homes and
towns, devastated fields and plundered storehouses, and a record for systematic torture,
pillage, and vandalism unequalled in American history.”7
For John Bennett Walters, then, Sherman’s total war involved “terror” against
defenseless citizens and “the savage art of destruction”; total war was “terror and
desolation”; it was “systematic torture, pillage, and vandalism” and “needless

6
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destruction.” Sherman taught his soldiers to hate Southerners and to rob them of their
human rights and dignity and to brutalize them and visit upon them “unrestrained pillage
and destruction.” Walters repeatedly castigated Sherman’s so-called “total war” tactics
as both criminal, inasmuch as they violated the rules of war, and unethical, since they
violated community standards and basic human rights. And, in Walters’s account, there
is the added sense that total war was inescapably more destructive, more violent, more
deadly, more vicious, more awful, more savage, more hateful, more brutal, than other
kinds of war. Although historians have sometimes not explicitly disclosed the sense in
which they use the term “total war,” it is often this last characteristic of terrible war—
what one might call “really, really awful war”—that they seem to mean. Walters, as it
turns out, is not alone in using exaggerated description to evoke the horrors of total war.
Similar language abounds in the Civil War literature right up to current times.8
If Walters overdramatized Sherman’s actions and the effects of war, how might
we begin to size up the difference between the reality of Union warfare and the extreme
rhetoric Walters uses to describe it? One place to start is with the rules of warfare that
existed before and during the Civil War. Indeed, it is important to note that all of the
“protections” guaranteed to civilian noncombatants by the rules of war—rules which
Walters claims Sherman crassly ignored—existed under international law prior to the
Civil War and were conditional upon the behavior of the noncombatants. General Orders
100, “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,”

8

See, for example, James M. McPherson, “From Limited War to Total War,” in Drawn with the
Sword: Reflections on the American Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 66-86. This
essay was originally published as “From Limited to Total War: Missouri and the Nation, 1862-1865,” in
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Neely’s “Was the Civil War a Total War?”
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signed by President Abraham Lincoln on April 24, 1863, clarifies the essential
conditionality of the rules governing the behavior of Union troops toward Confederate
civilians, even though those rules were not formally promulgated until later in the war.
Nevertheless, the generally accepted rules of war specified that noncombatants were to be
protected only if military necessity permitted. For instance, General Orders 100 provide
that “the noncombatant or civilian population should be free from all violence or
constraint other than that required by military necessity.” Another rule recognized what
today would be called “collateral damage” by stating that “the unarmed citizen is to be
spared in person, property and honor as much as the exigencies of war will admit.” These
protections did not extend to those who took up arms against the occupying forces.
According to Union General Henry W. Halleck, who in 1861 wrote a textbook on the
international law of war, “So long as they refrain from all hostilities, pay the military
contributions which may be imposed on them, and quietly submit to the authority of the
belligerent who may happen to be in military possession of their country, they are
allowed to continue in the enjoyment of their property, and in the pursuit of the ordinary
avocations.”9 It was left to the military commanders of occupied areas to judge the
meaning of “military necessity” and “the exigencies of war.”
Walters hoped to lay bare the process by which Sherman’s plan for total war was
developed, but it actually became one of the weakest elements in his article. For
instance, in his attempt to elucidate the process by which Sherman formulated his
9

General Order 100, April 24, 1863, U.S. Department of War, The War of the Rebellion: A
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Army, 130 vols. (Government Printing
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presumably immoral and violent philosophy of war, Walters maintained that the answer
could be found in Sherman’s “own personal background of failure and frustration, out of
which had come both an extreme sensitiveness to criticism and an impelling desire to
attain security.” Walters believed that Sherman sought to overcome earlier accusations
of his insanity in Kentucky and his combat mistakes at Shiloh by carrying out brutalities
against Confederate soldiers and civilians. He also pointed to an alleged cognitive
anomaly that afflicted Sherman—an anomaly, if Walters is to be believed, that led the
Union general to leap “over wide gaps of fact and reason and to proceed on the basis of
his inspirations and convictions with the utmost faith in the soundness of his
conclusions.” It was this cognitive deficiency, Walters argued, that led Sherman to
conclude that small groups of guerillas rather than regular Confederate soldiers were
committing the frequent acts of violence and destruction in West Tennessee against
Union military assets.10
But Walters, in making this psychological diagnosis, relied on Sherman’s
bombast and the general’s own proclivity for immoderate rhetoric, something which
Neely has identified as one of the possible sources in the evolution of the “total war
hypothesis.” Walters quoted a famous line from one of Sherman’s letters to his brother,
Senator John Sherman of Ohio, written in August 1862: “It is about time the North
understood the truth. That the entire South, man, woman, and child are against us, armed
and determined.”11 From this and other statements made by Sherman, Walters
constructed his case for the general’s “hatred” of Southerners and his development of a

10

Walters, “General Sherman,” 452, 458.

11

Sherman’s letter quoted in ibid., 460-461.

12
plan of terror against them. But Walters made broad claims regarding Sherman’s
attitudes and mental processes without taking into account that the Union general was not
alone in his ideas and attitudes, that other people in similar circumstances shared these
attitudes and ideas.
The problem of contending with hostile citizens in occupied territory was not, for
example, something that only Union officers had to face. Confederate General Edmund
Kirby Smith, who was operating in Unionist East Tennessee around this same time,
confronted similar partisan activity against his forces. On August 20, 1862, while
Sherman and other Union commanders faced guerilla attacks on their patrols and on
Mississippi River shipping, Gen. Kirby Smith issued a bulletin to the citizens of Knox
County in eastern Tennessee and neighboring counties in southern Kentucky. He warned
Unionist citizens to remain in their homes and assured them they could go about their
business as usual without fear. “If, on the contrary, you persist in firing upon my soldiers
from the woods, you will be hung when you are caught, and your houses and property
will be destroyed.” 12 Because they spent less time in enemy territory, Confederate
commanders did not encounter hostile guerilla activities as frequently as did their Union
counterparts. Nevertheless, whenever they ventured into Union territory they had to deal
with the same general problems that frustrated Sherman. Nor did the idea that all
secessionists were enemies of the Union originate with Sherman. Public opinion
throughout the North held that secessionists were traitors, especially after the Confederate
firing on Fort Sumter in April 1861.

12
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But what mostly caused difficulties for Sherman—and what governed his reaction
to hostile civilians—was the reality of attacks on Union shipping that occurred regularly
on the Mississippi River along those portions of the river under Federal control. Other
Union officers found these attacks to be just as troublesome as Sherman did. In August
1862, General Benjamin F. Butler, the Union commander in New Orleans, sent the 21st
Indiana up river to discourage guerillas who had been shooting at boats from the
Arkansas side. Ezra Read, the regimental surgeon, reported to Governor Oliver P.
Morton of Indiana that the regiment routed a force of 500 Texas Rangers deployed on the
west bank of the Mississippi River. The Texans, said Read, were sent to protect guerillas
who shot at boats on the river. Union troops defeated an attempt by the Texas troops to
ambush them, turned the tables, and captured almost 300 horses that had been ridden into
the swamps and cane breaks and then abandoned. The Texas Rangers, wrote Read,
continued to flee on foot through the swamps. Read clearly articulated his patriotism and
devotion to the Union cause, but he also revealed his low opinion of secessionists: “The
twenty-first [regiment] will perform its part nobly and well. It is for its country, first,
last, and forever; and against every man and woman whose hands are against it, and
against all men who will not sustain it in its terrible trials to sustain the best Government
ever framed by human mind.”13 Read’s comment was less inflammatory than Sherman’s
own rhetoric, but the underlying sentiment was the same—secessionist civilians, like
Confederate soldiers, opposed the Union, and any good Union man was duty bound to
oppose those Southerners in turn.
Central to Walters’ thesis about Sherman’s development of a plan to wage “total
war” against the Confederacy, including its civilians, is an incident that occurred at
13
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Randolph, Tennessee in September 1862. Sherman’s actions at Randolph, Walters
claims, show that the general, after learning that some shots had been fired at a Union
packet boat, began to wage “total war” against the civilian population of Tipton County
by “ordering that vengeance be wreaked on the town because it happened to be near the
scene of the trouble.” According to Walters, Sherman responded to the report that the
Union boat Eugene had come under fire near Randolph by ordering Col. C. C. Walcutt
and his 46th Ohio Volunteers to burn most of the town, but to leave one house standing to
mark the spot. In this way, said Walters, Sherman intended to discourage further attacks
on Mississippi River boats. This action was, Walters claimed, an unrestrained use of
military force against innocent civilians and it constituted a violation of the accepted
rules of war. He insisted that Sherman waged “total war”—the unrestrained use of
military force against a civilian population—on hapless residents of Randolph, a town in
West Tennessee, in Tipton County. In Walters’s view, “all restraints were being cast
aside.” 14 But did Walters provide an accurate account of what happened at Randolph? A
closer examination of the incident sheds new light on Sherman’s actions and on Tipton
County in the autumn of 1862. And it also gives some new meaning to John Bennett
Walters’s interpretation of the affair.

*

*

*

On Tuesday, September 23, 1862, the packet boat Eugene, on its regular trip
downriver from Cairo, Illinois, to Memphis, carried freight, passengers, U.S. mail, and
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Union officers. According to some reports, the Eugene had freight and two passengers
bound for Randolph, but other sources claim the packet boat was decoyed into landing at
Randolph by a man who hailed her from shore. In any event, when the boat landed at
Randolph at about 3 P.M., there was no one in sight. The ship’s clerk, Mr. Dalzell,
stepped ashore and headed up the hill to find out what was afoot. Suddenly the doors
flew open at one of the derelict warehouses at Randolph. Out leapt a crowd of thirty-five
armed partisans, led by a certain “Col. Faulkner,” who took Dalzell into custody. Despite
having a pistol held to each side of his head, Dalzell called out a warning to the Eugene.
With this, the ambushers began firing at the boat as those on board attempted to take the
Eugene back into the currents of the Mississippi River. Women and children poured out
onto the decks to see what was happening. The captain and the pilot, who were also on
deck, ducked for cover, and only the quick-thinking of the ship’s engineer, who
scrambled under fire to reach the helm, allowed the Eugene to escape the armed attack.
No one was injured, but there were dozens of bullet holes in the pilot house. Upon
reaching Memphis that evening, the crew, along with Union officers who had been
aboard, provided Gen. Sherman with a detailed report concerning the attack on the
Eugene at Randolph.15 As for Mr. Dalzell, the ship’s clerk, according to the unnamed
reporter for the Louisville Daily Journal, he was taken to Col. Faulkner’s camp ten miles
distant from Randolph where he was threatened with hanging and finally released and
escorted back to the Randolph area. The reporter pointed out that Faulkner and Dalzell
were acquainted with each other through their travels on the river.

15
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In Walters’s account, he criticized Sherman for jumping “to the conclusion that
this attack was the action of guerillas, and casually brushing aside the possibility that it
might have been made by Confederate soldiers.”16 But Walters ignored a great deal of
evidence about the Randolph incident in order to level his criticisms of Sherman. For
example, the attack was made in broad daylight with dozens of witnesses on board the
Eugene, none of whom reported seeing Confederate soldiers. If the attackers were
soldiers who were out of uniform then they were worse than guerillas, they were spies.
Walters overlooked important parts of Sherman’s orders to Col. Walcutt of the 46th Ohio
Volunteers. While Sherman did order Walcutt to burn the town of Randolph (with the
exception of a single house), he also instructed him to “let the people know and feel that
we deeply deplore the necessity of such destruction, but we must protect ourselves and
the boats which are really carrying stores and merchandise for the benefit of secession
families, whose fathers and brothers are in arms against us. If any extraordinary case
presents itself to your consideration you may spare more than one house; but let the place
feel that all such acts of cowardly firing upon boats filled with women and children and
merchandise must be severely punished.” Sherman also ordered Walcutt to have his
quartermaster make a list of all property destroyed in the raid along with the names of the
owners so that damages could eventually be paid if warranted.17
These additional details about Sherman’s orders to Walcutt mitigate the view of
“Sherman-as-terrorist,” which Walters urged in this article. There are other details that
Walters overlooked or, perhaps, purposely neglected. How much damage was really
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done at Randolph? What size town was Randolph? Were businesses targeted? Was the
economic system of Tipton County attacked?

*

*

*

Tipton County, Tennessee, where Randolph is located, was an agricultural county
in the western part of the state where families raised cotton and corn and hogs, as they do
today. The western boundary of the county is the Mississippi River, and at one time
(before 1837) some people in Randolph hoped their town would become a major
shipping point for local cotton. They aspired to compete with Memphis, a larger port
forty miles downstream at the mouth of the Wolf River.
When Tennessee held its referendum on secession in June 1861, the state voted
almost 3 to 1 in favor of leaving the Union. The city of Memphis did not wait for that
vote; it seceded from the Union four days after the South Carolinians fired on Fort
Sumter in April. In Tipton County the vote on June 8, 1861 was 943 for secession to 16
against. All 16 “no” votes were said to have come from the hamlet of Portersville, where
a few Yankee families had settled. In 1862 Tipton County was a hotbed of Confederate
feeling and of civilian resistance to Union efforts to pacify West Tennessee.18
The town of Randolph was founded in the late 1820s. Despite the desire of the
settlers to create a place that would become a commercial rival of Memphis, especially
during the times when Memphis was struck by outbreaks of yellow fever, the depression
18
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of 1837-38 hit Randolph hard when the price of cotton sank to 8.5 cents per pound from
17 cents. In addition, a period of low water in the Hatchie River, which formed the
northern and eastern boundaries of Tipton County, caused cotton to be shipped overland
to Memphis rather than downriver to Randolph, creating more economic woes for the
town. The town’s only bank closed in 1837, while its newspaper, the Randolph
Recorder, folded that same year. Then a sand bar began to form at Randolph, a part of
the natural process by which the Mississippi regularly alters its course, that made it
increasingly difficult for steamboats to dock there. Moreover, the bluffs began to
collapse forming a series of huge “steps” 20 to 30 feet above each other. Two other
disasters struck Randolph: The proposed railroad route through Randolph was relocated
to Memphis, and a proposed canal linking the Hatchie and Tennessee rivers was killed by
politics in 1832. President Andrew Jackson, and others, opposed internal improvements
funded by the federal government.19
According to an area resident, Randolph “was the most flourishing business river
town in West Tennessee on the Mississippi.” He claimed that if the canal had been built
connecting the Tennessee River with the Hatchie, Randolph’s growth would have been
assured and Memphis would have remained forever, a “village at the mouth of the Wolf.”
Alas, after the railroad route was lost to Memphis, Randolph’s businessmen moved
downriver to Memphis, and “Randolph as it was, is now only in name, and lives alone in
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the history of ‘Old Times in the Big Hatchie Country.’” By 1845, Randolph was a ghost
town.20
Following the opening salvos on Fort Sumter, in April 1861, a letter from an
unnamed Tipton County resident appeared in the Memphis Appeal suggesting that state
authorities send troops and artillery to Randolph. In the letter the author referred to
Randolph as a “near deserted village that was once the mighty arch-rival of Memphis.”
Randolph was, the writer claimed, the perfect place, high on the Chickasaw bluffs, from
which to defend Memphis from an attack by Union forces on the Mississippi. Tennessee
Governor Isham Harris promptly dispatched Lt. Col. Marcus Wright of the 154th militia
regiment at Memphis to Randolph where, on the site of the “near-deserted village,” Fort
Wright/Fort Randolph was constructed.21 Some of the town’s derelict buildings provided
lumber for the construction of warehouses, while an underground powder magazine was
dug out of the banks of the Mississippi. By early May it was reported in the Memphis
Daily Appeal that 400 men were in training at Randolph. At the end of May, soon-to-be
Confederate Generals John Sneed and Gideon Pillow hosted a visit to Fort Wright from
several Memphis-area ladies who were “sumptuously entertained.”22
During the summer of 1861 officials from the Confederate national government
came to Tennessee to take control of the troops and the defenses. There was a great hue
and cry from concerned citizens worried about the loss of local control, but they were
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mollified by both Confederate and Tennessee officials who assured them of convergent
interests. In July Fort Wright was closed; the troops and equipment were moved upriver
to Fort Pillow. Randolph became once again a near-deserted village along the
Mississippi.

*

*

*

Sherman, says Walters, “exploded into action” when he heard the report of the attack on
the Eugene.23 By nightfall on September 24, 1862, the Ohio Belle and the Eugene were
filled with the Ohio 46th Volunteer Infantry along with a battalion of artillery. Sherman
had suggested to Col. Walcutt, whom he placed in command of the expedition, that he
send one boat past Randolph to see it would draw fire; if it did, Walcutt and his troops
would know then what they were up against at Randolph. The flotilla reached the area
before daybreak on September 25. The Ohio Belle landed Walcutt and his troops below
Randolph while the Eugene steamed up the Mississippi as far as Fort Pillow without
drawing any fire. Meanwhile Walcutt and his troops reached Randolph without
resistance. They found no town, only a mostly deserted village with six houses and
dozens of abandoned and derelict buildings left over from Fort Wright and from older
projects at Randolph.
The soldiers let the tiny number of women residents know their orders and the
reasons for Gen. Sherman’s instructions to burn their homes. The troops gave the locals
a few hours to remove their belongings. A relative of one of the women later wrote that
the Yankees were very helpful—there was one woman who was bedridden so they came
23
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to her assistance to move her and her possessions out of the house (and then, once she
was gone, they helped themselves to such of her property as they desired). Then the
soldiers burned what buildings there were in the town, except for the single structure
Sherman had ordered to be left standing.24 Although it was a sad and stressful day for a
few West Tennesseans, the assault on Randolph cannot be said to be a prime example of
what Walters—and later historians—would call “total war.”
Walters saw this episode in a far different way: “While it was true that bands of
guerillas were extremely active in the region around Memphis and that unorganized
civilian resistance was frequently encountered, Sherman’s disposition to consider all
resistance as treacherous acts of the civilian population prepared the way for the next
steps in the development of his attitude on the conduct of the war.”25 But what Walters
missed, or could not see, was that Sherman’s reprisal against Randolph was not a step in
any grand scheme to wage war against the Southern civilian population, but was instead a
response to real threats and incidents of violence against Union resources.
Indeed, it was militarily prudent for Sherman to take into account all resistance
that arose from Confederate military forces but also from the civilian population, since it
was quite possible that Confederate soldiers might have disguised themselves as civilians
or that civilians were actually operating in the area as guerilla fighters. Sherman, as the
commanding officer of an occupying force, did not have the investigative resources of a
peacetime judicial system. Nevertheless, he had to make decisions about protecting his
troops and supplies; he also needed to maintain law and order in his jurisdiction.
24
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*

*

*

Is it accurate to view the episode at Randolph, Tennessee as a “total war” incident in
which Sherman “cast aside all restraints?” Sherman ordered Col. Walcutt to apologize to
the citizens and explain to them why this disagreeable action had to be taken. The Ohio
soldiers provided sufficient time for residents to remove their belongings. Walcutt’s
quartermaster kept a record of the property that was destroyed, and it appears that only
half a dozen homes were burned, along with dozens of abandoned and derelict buildings.
It is important to keep in mind that “total war” is a twentieth-century term and is
bound up with twentieth-century technology. It was first used in the 1920s to describe
the possibility of using airplanes to bypass the front lines to bomb an enemy’s homeland
selecting both civilian and military targets. This is neither a sufficient nor a necessary
reason that “total war” cannot be used to describe the Civil War or even the incident at
Randolph; but, because the term is so intimately connected to twentieth-century
technology, it is difficult to use it accurately when applying it to anything that happened
in the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, comparing a well-documented “total war” incident
with the incident at Randolph, Tennessee might be instructive.
Late in World War II, on March 9, 1945, hundreds of B-29s streamed out of the
Marianas loaded with napalm. Their destination was Tokyo, the capitol of Japan. With
few military targets remaining in Japan, the strategic point of this raid was to burn Tokyo
to the ground and inflict such horrifying casualties on Japanese civilians that the war
would have to end. “Within five months [in 1945],” writes historian Niall Ferguson,
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“roughly two-fifths of the built-up areas of nearly every major city had been laid waste,
killing nearly a quarter of a million people, injuring more than 300,000 and turning eight
million into refugees.” Eighty to a hundred thousand Japanese noncombatant civilians
were burned to death on that March night in 1945.26
That was “total war,” at least until the 1950s when the term acquired additional
nightmarish qualities as the USSR developed its own nuclear arsenal. The comparison
between the fire bombing of Tokyo in 1945 and Randolph in 1862 (or even the Union
army’s destruction of Atlanta or Columbia in 1864) must not stop at the obvious
quantitative level, at the mere, sheer numbers. For even if Sherman had been handed the
wherewithal to instantly kill a quarter of a million Southerners, or maybe even a mere
50,000, he probably would not have made use of such a destructive ability. The kind of
slaughter that occurred in Tokyo and in other places, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in 1945, was unthinkable to anyone who pondered the destructive capacity of warfare in
1862. Humankind needed technological advances, like the machine gun, and massive
political and diplomatic failures, such as occurred to bring on World War I and World
War II, to enhance war’s destructiveness to a level of mass annihilation. Seeing the Civil
War, and the minor incident at Randolph in 1862, as unrestrained acts of brutality reveals
how anachronistic Walters’s description of Sherman’s infliction of “total war” on the
residents of western Tennessee actually is. To read the destructiveness of the twentieth
century—both in its moral and its technological significance—backwards into the
previous century is to commit the cardinal historical sin of undermining “the integrity and
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the pastness of the past.”27 No matter how much the world may need to hear about the
dangers of war, no matter what moral message one has for the salvation of the world, no
historian has the right to try to change the past.
The concepts of “limited war” and “total war” are forever married to the twentieth
century where the latter came to mean, during the Cold War, a war of mutual
annihilation, a war in which multi-megaton missiles might blast human civilization back
at least into the Stone Age. The idea that this term “total war” ever had a legitimate
application in our study of the American Civil War seems strange. This historiographical
anomaly may, just in its outlandish, comedic aspects, serve to advance Page Smith’s
assertion in 1964 that “historical perspective,” our distance in time from an event, is no
guarantee of fairness and balance.28 That William Tecumseh Sherman could be vilified as
a terrorist for his raid on Randolph seems inexplicable when the evidence surrounding the
event is taken into full consideration.

*

*

*

But it is also odd that Walters’s article should have influenced other historians to
accept the description of the Civil War as “total war,” for there is no clear link between
Walters’s exposition of the Randolph episode and the later use of the term by historians
writing in the remaining decades of the twentieth century, despite Neely’s assumption of
such a thread. Neely believes that Walters’s thesis “was quickly adopted by T. Harry
Williams, whose influential book Lincoln and his Generals, published in 1952, began
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with this memorable sentence: ‘The Civil War was the first of the modern total wars, and
the American democracy was almost totally unready to fight it.’” Skipping nearly forty
years of intervening Civil War historiography, Neely also notes that historian Phillip
Shaw Paludan asserted that “Grant’s war making” amounted to “total war” because he
demanded the unconditional surrender of the enemy forces he defeated on the
battlefield.29 But Neely’s observation turns out to be superficial. Having used “total war”
in the first sentence of his book, Williams did not use it again until page 261, and even by
then, it was not entirely clear what he meant by “total war.” The thread between Walters
and Williams and Paludan is one of only appearances, not of substance. Williams and
Paludan both list Walters’s article in their bibliographies, but neither of these authors
actually discusses Walters’s thesis or cites his article in their footnotes. In fact, a strong
case can be made the Williams and Paludan use definitions of “total war” that differ
considerably from Walters’s use of the term.
Another prominent Civil War historian, James M. McPherson, departs from
Walters’s use of the term “total war,” but McPherson’s arguments have a bearing on a
consideration of Walters’s claims about Sherman and the raid on Randolph because many
Civil War scholars, influenced by McPherson’s high status in the profession, have
followed him in concluding that the Civil War was, indeed, a total war. McPherson’s
interpretation reveals, to some extent at least, how Walters’s application of “total war” to
Sherman and his actions in western Tennessee set the stage for the rise of the “total war”
thesis in the second half of the twentieth century. The point here is that scholars did not
necessarily build on Walters’s thesis by laying one block at a time to erect the “total war”
29
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edifice. Instead, they have used and accepted Walters’s terminology without giving its
anachronistic nature much thought. McPherson is a case in point.
Almost fifty years after John Bennett Walters wrote his article on “total war,”
McPherson published an article in which he argues that the Civil War went through a
transformation from a “limited war” to a “total war.” He speculates that many historians
have labeled the Civil War a “total war” because of “the devastation wrought by the war,
the radical changes it accomplished, and the mobilization of the whole society to sustain
the war effort.” Absolute war and total war,” writes McPherson, both mean “war
‘without any scruple or limitations,’ war in which combatants give no quarter and take no
prisoners.” But, McPherson allows at first that “in that sense of totality, the Civil War
was not a total war.” Quoting Neely, he agrees that no one in the Civil War
“systematically” targeted civilians. He echoes Neely’s point that the rhetoric of the Civil
War “was far more ferocious than anything that actually happened” and that we need to
look beyond the immoderate rhetoric to find what people actually did. We must avoid
judging the Civil War simply by what somebody said. McPherson concludes that “those
who insist that the Civil War was not a total war appear to have won their case.”30
But, McPherson, despite having just acknowledged the victory of the critics of
“total war,” suddenly reverses himself. He maintains that phrases used by other
historians, including “destructive war” and “hard war,” “do not convey the true
dimensions of devastation in the Civil War.” Instead, McPherson argues that for the
people who lived through the Civil War, especially Southerners, the war “seemed total”
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and therefore it was “total.”31 Although he strives to identify a commonality between the
past and the present, McPherson only succeeds in applying an anachronism to the past.
He labels the Civil War a “total war” because it produced a sense of dread and calamity
among the people who lived through it.
Despite his own shifting stand on the issue of “total war,” McPherson forges
ahead with an analysis of “the evolution” that occurred between 1861 and 1865 and
changed the Civil War from a limited war into a total war. To begin with, he asserts that
both sides, Union and Confederate, started with “limited” goals for the war. But
eventually, he says, the nature of the war changed and became “remorseless” and
“revolutionary,” when Union policy began to target Southern civilians. Echoing John
Bennett Walters’s assessment of Sherman’s response to guerilla attacks in West
Tennessee, McPherson writes: “These operations convinced Sherman to take off the
gloves. The distinction between enemy civilians and soldiers grew blurred. After fair
warning, Sherman burned houses and sometimes whole villages in western Tennessee
that he suspected of harboring snipers and guerillas.” Then he even borrows a Sherman
quote lifted from Walters’s book, Merchant of Terror, to prove that the Union general
had taken up “total war” against the South.32
In support of his “total war hypothesis,” McPherson merely recites the inherited
and incendiary wisdom about the Civil War. He writes of “the devastation and suffering
caused by the army’s scorched earth policy in the South,” a policy that does not hold
water when it comes to the incident at Randolph. A hatred of Southerners, McPherson
claims, “governed Sherman’s subsequent operations which left smoldering ruins in his
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track from Vicksburg to Meridian, from Atlanta to the sea, and from the sea to
Goldsboro, North Carolina.” From this, McPherson concludes that “the
kind of conflict the Civil War had become merits the label of total war. To be sure,
Union soldiers did not set out to kill Southern civilians. Sherman’s bummers destroyed
property; Allied bombers in World War II destroyed hundreds of thousands of lives as
well. But the strategic purpose of both was the same: to eliminate the resources and
break the will of the people to sustain war.”33 According to McPherson, the Civil War,
even though civilians were not systematically targeted, and even though the devastation
done by Union armies appears to have been greatly exaggerated, qualifies as a “total war”
because Sherman and Grant were willing to destroy whatever equipment and supplies
might benefit Confederate forces, and because they hoped to intimidate Southerners into
giving up their war-making. But surely he is mistaken in equating the historical
circumstances of the Civil War and World War II. Surely the destruction in these two
war differed in both degree and kind. Surely McPherson is projecting the devastation of
modern warfare back onto the Civil War, and in so doing is committing the historical
fallacy of anachronism.
There are four realities present in discussing the term “total war.” Two are
mental, or phenomenological, realities, while two are historical realities. There is the
way Civil War-era people experienced the war as a mighty and dreadful calamity. There
is also the way that twentieth-century people experienced World War II and the peril of a
war of mutual annihilation in the decades after 1945. Probably human psychology has
not changed very much in one hundred fifty years, so we may safely speculate that these
phenomenological realities may be very similar. Having faced a dreadful calamity as the
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result of war, twentieth-century people may be well positioned to understand the sense of
dread and calamity experienced by people in Civil War times. The third and fourth
realities, the historical realities, are the two wars. And just because these wars evoked
similar states of mind in participants, it is not necessarily the case that the wars were the
same.
“Total war” is a product of the twentieth century. The term seems never to have
been used in the nineteenth century. Historians do not agree on when the term first
appeared, but there does not seem to be any disagreement about what it first referred to—
i.e., the possibility that technology (especially aircraft) made real for bypassing the front
lines of a war to attack civilian and military targets within the enemy nation. “Total war”
reached an unholy sort of crescendo during World War II in the firebombing of Japanese
cities and then in the use of atomic bombs against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The term
continued to evolve, and during the Cold War “total war” came to include the
nightmarish idea of a “war of mutual annihilation” in which thousands of megatons of
hydrogen bombs were poised everyday to destroy the entire human race and nearly
everything else on the planet. Few residents of the first world who lived through the
1950s and the 1960s, and even later, could have escaped the dread and foreboding which
infected our daily existence. This aspect of “total war”—this idea of the total
annihilation of the species—is what makes the term totally inappropriate when applied to
the American Civil War, which was still a hundred years away from the technological
possibilities of mass death and terror to which this term refers. When historians use the
term “total war” to describe the Civil War, they unintentionally project our modern
horrors backwards a hundred or more years and assign them to the Civil War generation.
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Perhaps we need to abandon this term “total war” in connection with the
American Civil War. A new descriptive term is needed that does justice to the experience
of people who lived through that war in their own time but that does not conflate the
military realities of the Civil War with the specter of twentieth century nuclear war.

*

*

*

Mark Grimsley, in a history of the Union high command and its treatment of
Southern civilians during the war, offers a term that avoids the anachronism of “total
war” but accurately captures the intensity of the Civil War in all its aspects. Grimsley
suggests that the Civil War was actually a “hard war,” a term he borrows from Sherman’s
own use of the phrase “hard hand of war” to describe the Union effort to destroy enemy
armies and resources during the final phases of the contest. Instead of a campaign driven
by hate in 1863, as pictured by John Bennett Walters and other fans of the “total war
hypothesis,” Grimsley detects rational policies and predominantly rational behavior
among Union forces as they employed “directed severity” in attacking property that could
be used by the Confederate war effort. Homes and supplies for the civilian population,
he argues, were generally spared by Union troops. Northern troops were restrained far
more often than they were unrestrained.34
Grimsley identifies how Union military policy toward civilians in the rebellious
states evolved over time. The first phase of Union military policy toward civilians, a
phase which Grimsley labels the “conciliatory” phase, was informed by the belief that
widespread pockets of “Unionism” existed in the South and that these people remained
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secretly loyal to the United States. If Southern civilians were treated well they would
turn on the secessionists as soon as Union forces arrived in the neighborhood. An
important part of this policy was an explicit stance against interfering with slavery.
Lincoln adopted this position from the beginning. He even offered the South, in an
attempt to stave off secession, a constitutional amendment guaranteeing noninterference
in the peculiar institution in those states which already had slavery. The “strategic
dimension” of the conciliatory phase was to “detach Southern civilians from their
allegiance to the Confederate government . . . through respect and magnanimity.”35 This
conciliatory phase ended during the summer of 1862.
The middle phase of Union policy, Grimsley maintains, was characterized by
pragmatism and the lack of a strategic dimension. Union military commanders on the
ground “foraged when they needed to forage and retaliated when beset by guerillas, but
otherwise viewed civilians as peripheral to their concerns.”36 Indeed, Sherman was in
West Tennessee during this pragmatic phase. Grimsley’s focus on the pragmatism
behind Union military policy in the occupied South provides a more useful interpretation
of Sherman’s actions than does Walters’s idea that the Union general was devising a
“total war” policy at this time. Sherman was clearly reacting to guerilla actions when he
ordered the raid on Randolph, which is wholly consistent with the pragmatic policy
Grimsley delineates.
The preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, issued in September 1862, signaled
an end to conciliation as Union policy, says Grimsley, and, following the middle phase,
ushered in the “hard war” phase of Union military policy toward Southern civilians. This
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“hard war” phase began in the western theater in April 1863, but did not appear in the
East until 1864 when Grant was elevated to general in chief. Grimsley observes: “The
classic hard war operations that historians have found so striking had at least two main
attributes. First, they were actions against Southern civilians and property made
expressly in order to demoralize Southern civilians and ruin the Confederate economy. . .
. Second, they involved the allocation of substantial military resources to accomplish the
job.” This hard war phase had the same strategic dimension as the earlier conciliatory
phase—“to detach Southern civilians from their allegiance to the Confederate
government”—but a different approach to that strategy. This time the approach was
through “intimidation and fear,” rather than “respect and magnanimity.”37
As compared to Walters’s interpretation of the Randolph raid as signaling the start
of a total, unrestrained, barbarous, brutal and indiscriminate way of making war,
Grimsley depicts instead the results of a policy of “directed severity.”38 He reveals that
Union conduct in the war at the time of the Randolph incident was rational. The Union
had tried a conciliatory policy which, while rationally conceived, failed to accomplish
what had been hoped for it. It did not loosen the bonds that connected Southern civilians
to the Confederate government. A different policy, the “hard war” policy, still rational,
was beginning to guide actions in the field after the failure of conciliation. Sherman, and
others, still hoped the Southern civilians could be alienated from their government, but
this time they were going to try fear and intimidation. In the end, their new policy
worked.
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Grimsley asks a salient question that sits at the heart of this study: “If the Union
Military effort against Southern property was indeed discriminate and roughly
proportional to legitimate needs, why have so many interpretations insisted for so long
that it was indiscriminate and all-annihilating?” In answering his own question,
Grimsley suggests that interpretations of the war’s severity and brutality may have
actually begun during the war itself and that they have served different agendas over the
decades since. Perhaps, Grimsley says, this might explain the persistence of what Neely
calls the “total war hypothesis.”39 One agenda that was obviously served by this view of
the conflict was the Confederate agenda itself. Confederate political leaders demonized
Northerners, fearing a nascent longing for re-unionism among Southern civilians in the
same way Union leaders hoped for it. When Lincoln sent a supply ship to Fort Sumter,
the Memphis Daily Appeal fulminated against the perfidy and mendacity of the “Black
Republicans” in Washington D. C. Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard issued a
strident proclamation in June 1861 warning that the Northern abolitionists had been
thrown into northern Virginia “murdering civilians, seizing private property” and were
intent on “committing other acts of violence and outrage too shocking and revolting to
humanity to be enumerated.”40
Much of the immoderate rhetoric of the “total war” adherents sounds as though it
might have come from Jefferson Davis himself. Grimsley provides a germane sample of
Davis’ rhetoric: “Jefferson Davis railed against ‘the savage ferocity’ of Union military
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conduct. ‘The frontier of our country,’ he wrote in 1863, ‘bears witness to the alacrity and
efficiency with which the general orders of the enemy have been executed in the
devastation of farms, the destruction of the agricultural implements, the burning of the
houses, and the plunder of everything movable.’”41
Southerners continued these propaganda claims as a part of the Redeemer
movement following the war. Eventually they found their way into the accepted tenets of
Lost Cause ideology. These claims established that the South had been done an
unspeakable wrong and had not been fairly defeated, for the North had conducted an
immoral and destructive war against them. Moreover, tales of the brutality of the North
afforded many Southerners the opportunity to avoid remembering the destructive and
draconian actions of their own government, as “when Grandpappy reminisced about how
his team of prized horses had disappeared, he preferred to recall that Yankee vandals had
done it—even if the real culprit had been a Confederate impressment agent.”42 Perhaps,
Grimsley suggests, the perpetuation of the myth of destruction and pillage by Union
forces deflects attention from the fact that secession is what brought on the war and it is
the South’s fault that so horrible a war ensued as a result.
Whatever the reason for the use of the term “total war” to describe the Civil War,
it is now time to retire the phrase from our historical lexicon. Grimsley’s “hard war”
suffices to convey the bloody nature of a war that left 620,000 Americans dead (220,000
combat deaths and 400,000 victims of diseases that ravaged camps on both sides) and
tens of thousands more wounded. Walters stepped beyond the bounds of historical
evidence in ascribing the motive of “total war” to Sherman in the Randolph incident, just
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as McPherson and other historians have exaggerated the entire war into a conflagration
equal to the destructiveness of World War II.
Historians would be far better served, in fact, by returning to the old work on
Lincoln and his commanders written by T. Harry Williams. What Williams
accomplished in this book was a lucid and intelligent description of the Civil War’s
course as a conflict that intensified as it raged on. But his view of the war avoided any
suggestion—despite his use of the term offhandedly in two passages of his book—that
the Civil War was a “total war.” Describing a war that began with faltering
incompetence, for the Union was completely unprepared for war, Williams demonstrated
how Lincoln’s unwavering insight into the objective of the war—the total defeat of the
enemy’s armed forces—provided guidance through troubled times. And he traced the
slow, but steady, emergence of a modern command system in the Union war effort that at
last provided the edge needed for a complete Union victory. According to Williams, this
command system emerged organically from the war efforts, from the trial and error
process that commanders (and the commander-in-chief) must undergo when they are
plunged into the maelstrom of war. Williams saw no need to burden his account with
twentieth-century concepts like “limited war” and “total war.” Such terms offered no
interpretive advantage, then or now.
The concept of “total war” as applied to the Civil War is irrelevant. What is
more, it is an anachronistic intellectual artifact that serves only as an obstacle to our
knowing and understanding the Civil War on its own terms.
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